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1 Introduction 
Commodity prices are, by any standard, extremely volatile. After inspecting thirteen 
primary commodities over the period 1900-1987 (deflated annual data), Deaton and 
Laroque (1992) found price variation coefficients, defined as the standard variation over 
the mean, ranging from 0.17 (bananas) to 0.60 (sugar). In addition, one often observes 
dramatic boom and bust episodes. For instance, the decline in prices from the highest 
level reached in the period from 1974 to August 1975 was 67 percent for sugar, 58 
percent for sisal, more than 40 percent for cotton and rubber, and more than 25 percent 
for cocoa and jute (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). In a recent study, Osborne (2003) 
reported that in Ethiopia the price of maize has more than doubled three times over the 
last fifteen years. 
Not only many developing countries, but also the United States and the 
European Union, have thus experimented with some form of commodity price 
stabilization scheme in the past. In particular, attempts have been made to stabilize 
agricultural commodity markets by means of a commodity buffer stock scheme. The 
idea of such schemes is to put a certain amount of output into storage in years in which 
there is a good harvest, thus increasing the price from what it would have been, and to 
sell output from the storage in years in which there is a small harvest, thus reducing the 
price from what it would have been. Another prominent example is the oil market. 
Following the oil crises in the 1970´s, many countries built up huge oil reserves in order 
to influence the market. 
Demand and supply schedules, storage and fully rational speculators are the key 
elements in neo-classical commodity market models (Waugh 1944, Brennan 1958, 
Williams and Wright 1991, Deaton and Laroque 1992, 1996, Chambers and Bailey 
1996, Osborne 2003). While these models undoubtedly capture some important aspects 
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of commodity markets, their ability to mimic features such as bubbles and crashes is, 
however, limited. Supporters of these models – in which the markets are efficient by 
nature – judge commodity price stabilization schemes as unlikely to have a significant 
beneficial effect (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). 
 Contrary to the efficient market hypothesis, however, there is not only 
widespread populist feeling that speculators are a major cause of price instability, but 
also theoretical papers have started to explore this aspect. The chartist-fundamentalist 
approach, developed in the last decade, offers a new and promising alternative 
behavioral perspective of financial market dynamics. The main feature of this approach 
is that interactions between heterogeneous agents, so-called chartists and 
fundamentalists, may generate an endogenous nonlinear law of motion of asset prices. 
In Day and Huang (1990), Chiarella (1992), and Farmer and Joshi (2002) the 
nonlinearity originates from nonlinear technical and fundamental trading rules whereas 
in Kirman (1991), Brock and Hommes (1998), Lux and Marchesi (2000), the 
nonlinearity is caused by the agents switching between a given set of predictors.1 More 
recent refinements and applications include Chiarella and He (2001), Chiarella, Dieci 
and Gardini (2002) and Westerhoff (2003). Since these models have demonstrated their 
ability to match the stylized facts of financial markets quite well one may conclude that 
this framework is suitable to conduct some policy evaluation experiments. 
 This paper aims at developing a commodity market model along the lines of the 
chartist-fundamentalist approach to characterize price fluctuations and to unravel the 
potential effects of price limiters. Its main ingredients are as follows: For simplicity, 
                                                 
1 A closely related branch of research studies complex dynamics in cobweb markets, e.g. Hommes 
(1994), Brock and Hommes (1997), Goeree and Hommes (2000) and Chiarella and He (2003).  
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demand and supply schedules are expressed in a reduced log-linear form. Fundamental 
to the model is the behavior of the speculators who switch between technical and 
fundamental trading rules to determine their positions in the market. Prices adjust via a 
log-linear price impact function: Excess supply (demand) decreases (increases) the 
price. Our model shows that: (i) the chartists are a source of market instability, as 
commonly believed, (ii) weak reaction of the speculators (either the fundamentalists or 
the chartists) can push the market to be either a bull or a bear market (through pitchfork 
bifurcations); and (iii) strong reaction of the speculators causes market prices to switch 
irregularly between bull and bear markets (through flip bifurcations). Since prices 
fluctuate in a complex way between bull and bear markets, the model is capable of 
replicating some features of commodity price motion.  
The paper then focuses on the impact of simple price limiters as a potential 
stabilizing mechanism to reduce price fluctuations. Simulations reveal that if a central 
authority guarantees a minimum price, e.g. to support the producers, volatility declines. 
Although the price is backed up from below, the average price of the commodity 
surprisingly decreases, too. Setting up an upper price limit, e.g. to protect consumers 
from excessive prices, again yields a drop in price variability. However, the average 
price the consumers have to pay increases. At least at first sight, this result appears to be 
counterintuitive and should give policy-makers a warning. Simple measures to control 
prices may have surprising consequences in a nonlinear world.  
This puzzling outcome is caused by a dynamic lock-in effect. Consider the case 
of a crash without a price limiter mechanism. Within our model, a bull market turns into 
a bear market after the price has crossed a critical upper level. A central authority that 
intervenes successfully against high prices obviously destroys the necessary condition 
for such a regime shift. As a result, the average price is higher than without an upper 
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price restriction. Moreover, since the price fluctuates at a high level, it reaches the upper 
price boundary repeatedly so that the buffer stock is likely to run empty rather quickly. 
We show that one way to counter this problem is to alternate temporarily between an 
upper and a lower price boundary. The price volatility then decreases, yet the market 
remains distorted. However, on-off switching of the stabilization mechanism as well as 
changing the level of price limiters interferes with the price discovery process and may 
cause severe bubbles and crashes or volatility clustering. 
As it turns out, price limiters as applied in our model are identical to a recently 
developed chaos control method. The development of chaos control algorithms was 
initiated by Ott, Grebogi and Yorke (1990) (henceforth OGY). Other popular 
suggestions include, for instance, the delayed feedback control method of Pyragas 
(1992) or the constant feedback method of Parthasarathy and Sinha (1995). The OGY 
control scheme and its descendants have been applied in various fields such as 
mechanics, electronics or chemistry. Economic applications include Kopel (1997), Kaas 
(1998) or Westerhoff and Wieland (2003). The feasibility of using chaos controllers in 
reality depends on the complexity and efficiency of the control algorithm. The chaos 
control process requires measurement of the system´s state, generation of a control 
signal, and the application of the control signal to an accessible system parameter. For 
instance, the original OGY control scheme requires knowledge of the map and its fixed 
point. While such information may be identified from observations in natural science 
applications, chaos control in an economic context is often seen as rather critical.  
However, Corron, Pethel and Hopper (2000) present experimental evidence that 
chaos control can be accomplished using simple limiters and argue that chaos control 
can be practically applied to a much wider array of important problems than thought 
possible until recently. This method, which has been analytically and numerically 
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explored by Wagner and Stoop (2000) and Stoop and Wagner (2003), simply restricts 
the phase space that can be explored. Suppose that a variable fluctuates between 0<x<1. 
A limiter from below resets all values x<h to h. As a result, the new system may replace 
previously chaotic behavior with periodic behavior. One advantage of the limiter 
method is that it does not add complexity to the system by increasing the size of the 
system´s state space. Another advantage is that stabilization may already be achieved by 
infrequent interventions. As far as we are aware, this paper contains the first economic 
study of limiters. And indeed, the method is able to decrease price fluctuations quite 
easily, yet with the (economic) disadvantage of a lock-in effect as stressed above. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 
commodity market model with heterogeneous interacting agents and, by using stability 
and bifurcation analysis, section 3 examines the price dynamics of the model without 
price limiter mechanisms. In section 4, we discuss the consequences of single-price 
limiters for the price dynamics, and in section 5, we introduce conditional price limiters. 
The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2 The Model 
This section aims at developing a behavioral commodity market model. The model 
consists of well-established building blocks often used in the literature on chartist and 
fundamentalist interactions. Only the model´s ability to capture some commodity 
market aspects is novel. Our main goal is to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of 
price limiters, for this reason, we strive to design a model that is as simple as possible. 
To be precise, we consider a market with three types of agents: consumers, producers 
and speculators. Speculators are heterogeneous in the sense that they are aware of both 
technical and fundamental trading strategies, and, at the beginning of each trading 
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period, they choose one of the two strategies as their trading strategy for the trading 
period. Their behavior may be regarded as boundedly rational since the selection of a 
strategy depends on market circumstances. 
Following Farmer and Joshi (2002), we assume that the price adjustment on the 
commodity market may be approximated by a log-linear price impact function. Hence, 
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where a is a positive scaling coefficient to calibrate the price adjustment speed, , 
 and  stand for the excess demand of the real economy, the chartists and the 
fundamentalists respectively at time t. The weight of the chartists at time t is given as 
, whereas the weight of the fundamentalists is given as W . According to (1), the 





We use a reduced form to describe the demand and supply decisions of the real 
economy. Suppose that the demand and supply schedules of consumers and producers 
are log-linear. Then the excess demand may be expressed as 
)( t
M
t SFmD −= ,                                                                                                          (2) 
where m reflects the slopes of the demand and supply curves. The log of the long-run 
equilibrium price, which we also call the fundamental value, is denoted by F. Since we 
assume that the structure of the economy is stable, i.e. there are no (permanent) demand 
and supply shocks, F is constant over time.  
The excess demand of the real economy is zero when the price of the commodity 
is equal to its fundamental value. Such a state is obviously efficient. Note that in the 
absence of speculators (W ), the law of motion of the commodity price has 0== FtCt W
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a unique fixed point at , which is stable for 0FSt = 2<< am . 
 Speculators are familiar with both technical and fundamental analysis. Indeed, 
the use of destabilizing trend extrapolation and stabilizing mean reversion trading 
strategies has been confirmed in survey studies among professional traders (Taylor and 
Allen 1992) as well as in laboratory experiments (Smith 1991, Sonnemans et al. 2003). 
To model the excess demand generated by technical analysis we adopt a formulation of 
Day and Huang (1990) 
)( FSbD t
C
t −= ,                                                                                                        (3) 
where b is a positive reaction coefficient. So-called chartists typically believe in bear 
and bull markets. As long as the price is above its fundamental value, chartists regard 
the market as bullish. Since a further price increase is expected, chartists tend to buy the 
commodity. However, if the price drops below its fundamental value then the chartists 
become pessimistic. In a bear market, chartists sell the commodity. 
 Fundamental analysis presumes that prices revert toward their fundamental 
value. If the price is below (above) its equilibrium value, higher (lower) prices are 
expected and fundamental analysis favors buying (selling) the commodity. The excess 
demand generated by fundamental analysis may be formalized as 
)( t
F
t SFcD −= .                                                                                                      (4) 
The reaction coefficient c is positive. 
The switching mechanism is based on an argument put forward by Hommes 
(2001). Speculators try to exploit bull and bear market situations. However, the more 
the price deviates from its fundamental value, the greater the speculators perceive the 
risk that the bull or bear market might collapse. As a result, an increasing number of 
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speculators opt for fundamental trading strategies.2 The market share of speculators who 











,                                                                                          (5) 
where  is a switching parameter. The higher d is, the faster speculators switch to 
fundamental analysis as the mispricing increases. The weight of the fundamentalists is, 
of course, W  Ct1 .
 The solution of the model is derived by combining (1)-(5) 
3
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which is a one-dimensional nonlinear map.  
 
3 Price Dynamics without Price Limiters 
The model (6) can be written as: 
( )1tS f S+ = ,                                                                                                            (7) 
where 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
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,                                                           (8) 
and a, b, c, d, m are positive constants. To understand the impact of price boundaries, 
 
2 An alternative justification is advocated by de Grauwe, Dewachter and Embrechts (1993). They argue 
that fundamentalists are heterogeneous with respect to their perception of the fundamental value. If the 
price is equal to its fundamental value, half of the fundamentalists underestimate the fundamental value 
and the other half overestimate the fundamental value. The net demand of fundamentalists is therefore 
zero. As the distance between S and F grows, the net position of fundamentalists becomes increasingly 
higher, implying that the market impact of chartists decreases.  
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this section focuses on the price dynamics of the deterministic model (6) without 
imposing any price limiter. Our analysis includes the existence of multiple steady states, 
their stability and bifurcation routes to complex price dynamics. The result is 
summarized as follows.  
Proposition 1: For model (6), 
• if b ≤ m , then F is the unique steady state. In addition, 
- it is locally asymptotically stable (LAS) if a(m-b)<2; 
- a flop bifurcation (i.e. the eigenvalue is 1) occurs when m=b; 
- a flip bifurcation (i.e. the eigenvalue is -1) occurs when (m-b)a=2. 




−= ± + , 
and F is always unstable, while S±  is LAS if 
( )( )2 1b m c ma
b c
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In addition, 
- a flop bifurcation occurs when m=b; 
- a flip bifurcation occurs when ( )( )2 1b m c ma
b c
− + =+ . 
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Then  defines the flip bifurcation boundary of the local stability region of 
the fundamental (nonfundamental) steady-state price, while b=m defines the common 
flop bifurcation boundary of the local stability regions of both fundamental and non-
fundamental steady-state prices. It can be verified that, for b>m,  decreases 
as c increases. In addition, 
(1b b b b= = )2
( )2 2b b c=
( )2 22 1 /m→ +b a  as  and  as 
. The local stability regions of both fundamental and nonfundamental steady- 
state prices and their bifurcation boundaries are plotted in figure 1. 
a c → ∞
S
( )2 22 / 1a m→ −2 2b a m
0c →
±
(S S+ − )
Figure 1 goes about here 
The implications of Proposition 1 are discussed with respect to the effects of 
reactions from the chartists and fundamentalists, respectively. 
 
3.1. Effect of Price Dynamics Under the Chartists   
We first examine the effect of the chartists’ extrapolation, which is measured by the 
reaction coefficient b. It follows from Proposition 1 that for 0<b1<b<m the fundamental 
price F is locally asymptotically stable; while for m<b<b2, the fundamental price F 
becomes unstable but the two nonfundamental prices  become locally stable. Hence, 
b=m leads to a pitchfork bifurcation with respect to the extrapolation coefficient b of 
the chartists. In addition, the nonfundamental steady-state price  increases 
(decreases) as the extrapolation of the chartists increases. This reflects a double-edged 
effect of the speculators. On the one hand, chartist activity to some extent improves the 
stability of the fundamental steady-state price to otherwise unstable commodity prices, 
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and hence improves market efficiency.3 On the other hand, a strong extrapolation from 
the chartists leads to market instability, which is a common belief that chartists are a 
source of market instability.4 
 Figure 2 goes about here 
 For fixed c=1.5, d=1, m=1, a=1 and F=0, the upper panel of figure 2 illustrates 
the bifurcation plot of the price in terms of the extrapolation coefficient b of the 
chartists over . Following from Proposition 1, the fundamental price F=0 is 
locally asymptotically stable for b
(0,5)b∈
(0,1)∈ , unstable for b>1, and b=1 leads to a 
pitchfork bifurcation. For b>1, depending on the initial values, the two nonfundamental 
steady-state prices are locally stable for 1<b<2.66 and b=2.66 leads to a flip bifurcation 
from each of the two nonfundamental steady-state prices. The bifurcation plot in the 
upper panel of figure 2 has verified those analytical results. As b increases further, 
period-doubling type of bifurcation appears, leading to periodic cycles, quasi-periodic 
cycles and even more complicated price dynamics. For example, for b=4, 4.5, 5.5 and 6, 
figure 3 illustrates the price series and figure 5 gives the corresponding phase plots, that 
is the price in period t+1 is plotted against the price in period t, for b=4 and b=4.5. 
 Overall, weak extrapolations from the chartists can generate either a bull or a 
bear market, while strong extrapolations can make the market price fluctuate between 
                                                 
3 In fact, in the absence of speculators ( )0C Ft tW W= = , the fundamental price F is stable for 0<am<2. 
However, in the presence of speculators (in particular, of chartists), this stability region of the 
fundamental price F is enlarged to 0<am<2+ab with b<m. 
4 An increase in the extrapolation (measured by parameter b) of the chartists results in two non-
fundamental steady-state prices . One is above and one is below the fundamental steady-state price, 
leading to a pitchfork-type bifurcation. 
S±
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bull and bear markets. In addition, both time series and bifurcation plots indicate that 
the market price becomes more volatile as the extrapolation from the chartists increases. 
Figures 3 and 4 go about here 
 
3.2. Effect of Price Dynamics Under the Fundamentalists  
We now examine the effect of the fundamentalists. It is interesting to see that the 
reaction coefficient c from the fundamentalists plays no role in the stability of the 
fundamental price F (since coefficient c is associated with a higher order term ( )  
in equation (6)). However, it affects the stability of the two nonfundamental steady- 




S± (S S+ − )
+ and S- reflect the average price levels of bull and bear markets when the fundamental 
price is unstable. Hence, an increase in c brings these average price levels close to the 
fundamental price level, implying a stabilizing role of the fundamentalists. 
When b=b2, the two nonfundamental steady states become unstable through flip 
bifurcation, leading to period cycles and strange attractors. For example, for fixed 
b=4.5, when c is near 0, prices converge to either one of the steady states, depending on 
the initial prices. For c=0.5 up to 0.8, two-period cycles bifurcate from the two non-
fundamental steady states and prices converge to either one of the two 2-period cycles. 
As c increases further, period cycles, quasi-periodic cycles and even complicated price 
dynamics induced from period-doubling bifurcation occur. For example, for c=0.85, 
prices converge to either one of two 4-period cycles, one being above the fundamental 
price and one being below the fundamental price, depending on the initial price. For 
c=0.93, prices converge to either one of the two 4-piece attractors. For c=0.94 up to 2, 
the two 4-piece attractors become two 2-piece attractors. As c increases further, it has 
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the same effect on the price dynamics as the strong extrapolation from the chartists, 
discussed in the previous subsection. Such complicated price dynamics generated 
through period-doubling (flip) bifurcations are illustrated by the bifurcation plot for 
parameter c in the lower panel of figure 2. 
Based on the above analysis, one can see that weak reaction from the 
fundamentalists has a stabilizing effect on the price dynamics. However, because of the 
instability of the fundamental price, such stabilizing efforts from the fundamentalists 
result in pushing the price away from the nonfundamental steady-state prices. This leads 
prices to converge to periodic and quasi-periodic cycles, which oscillate either above or 
below the fundamental price with low volatility. On the other hand, strong reaction from 
the fundamentalists results in irregular price fluctuations on both sides of the 
fundamental price with high volatility. 
 Both analytical and numerical analyses have shown that both fundamentalists 
and chartists affect the market price in a complicated way. Chartists are the source of 
market instability. When the fundamental steady-state price becomes unstable, there are 
two nonfundamental steady-state prices, one being above and one being below the 
fundamental steady-state price. Weak reaction from either fundamentalists or chartists 
can generate either bull or bear markets, while strong reaction from both speculators can 
make the market price fluctuate between bull and bear markets. In general, strong 
reaction from the chartists leads to high volatility, while strong reaction from the 






4 Simple Price Limiters 
Next, we study the consequences of the limiter method – as suggested by Corron, Pethel 
and Hopper (2000) – on commodity price dynamics. Price limiters may easily be 
implemented in our framework.5 In the case of a minimum price , (1) becomes minS
]),([ min1 SSfMaxS tt =+ ,                                                                                       (11) 
in the case of a maximum price ,maxS  the price adjustment modifies according to 
]),([ max1 SSfMinS tt =+ ,                                                                                     (12) 
and in the case of a minimum and a maximum price restriction, one obtains 
]],),([[ maxmin1 SSSfMaxMinS tt =+ .                                                                  (13) 
In order to avoid black markets, the central authority has, of course, to intervene in the 
market. For instance, to prevent the price from dropping below the minimum price the 
central authority has to buy a fraction of the supplied commodity. 
Let us start the analysis by comparing the two time series displayed in figure 5, 
where we assume , , 1=a 5.4=b 5.1=c , 1=d , 1=m  and 0=F . The top panel of 
figure 5 shows the evolution of the commodity price without a price limiter in the time 
domain (200 observations). Visual inspection reveals again the model´s ability to 
produce bubbles and crashes, as observed in many commodity markets. 
Concerned with the turbulent dynamics, a central authority may try to support 
the producers by guaranteeing them a minimum price. The bottom panel of figure 5 
presents a simulation run in which . The impact of such a price 
stabilization scheme may be quite dramatic. Note first that the price fluctuations appear 
to be much lower. And in fact, the variance of the price drops from around 1.11 (no 
6.1min −=S
                                                 
5 For the sake of convenience, we refer to S as the price instead of the log of the price in this section. 
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price restriction) to 0.18. But the average price is also affected by this policy. Now, the 
price always fluctuates below its fundamental value. To be precise, the average price 
decreases from about 0 to –1.07 (all statistics are based on simulation runs with 10,000 
observations). At least at first sight, this is surprising. The central authority aims to 
protect the producers from too low prices, yet the average price drops.  
Figure 5 goes about here 
What causes this puzzling outcome? Figure 6 presents the dynamics in phase 
space. The left panel shows the unrestricted dynamics while the right panel contains the 
restricted dynamics. The parameter setting is the same as in figure 5. The smooth lines 
indicate the two one-dimensional maps. From the left panel it becomes clear that a 
change from a bear market into a bull market requires the price to drop to a rather low 
value. But, due to the minimum price, the map in the right panel is flat at . 
This prevents the system from switching from a bear market to a bull market. Clearly, 
the price is locked-in below its fundamental value. Furthermore, the right plot reveals 
that the commodity price is not longer chaotic but follows a period 14 cycle. Since the 
price hits the lower price limit every 14 periods, the central authority has to buy a 
fraction of the supplied commodity every 14 periods. By regularly taking out a fraction 
of the excess supply, the central authority builds up a huge buffer stock or even has to 
destroy its purchases. Both options are costly and unsustainable over a longer time.  
6.1min −=S
Figure 6 goes about here 
Figure 7 demonstrates the robustness of the dynamic lock-in effect. The top left 
panel shows a bifurcation diagram in which the minimum price is increased in 500 steps 
from –2 to 0. To allow the system to settle on its attractor, the dynamics is plotted for 
the prices between the periods 500 and 600. As can be seen, the chaotic behavior turns 
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into periodic behavior as the minimum price increases. At around , even a 
fixed point emerges. The top right panel reveals symmetrical results for an upper price 
boundary, which decreases from 2 to 0. 
18.1min −=p
The second and third panels in figure 7 present how the mean and the variance 
of the price react to a change in the price limit. To obtain reasonable statistics, IID 
shocks with white noise N (0, 0.1) are added to the system at every time step. The 
limiter method indeed proves its power in stabilizing the dynamics. Already minor price 
restrictions may eliminate the larger part of the price variability. But the average price is 
simultaneously affected. Restricting the price from below (above) increases (decreases) 
the mean of the price in an adverse manner. Only if the restrictions are very sharp may a 
lower (higher) price boundary lead to an increase (decrease) in the average price. 
Figure 7 goes about here 
To sum up, it turns out that the price dynamics under price limiters when both 
speculators react strongly is similar to the price behavior without imposing price 
limiters when either of the speculators react weakly. Consequently, one may conclude 
that the central authority eliminates the strong reactions of the speculators that push for 
the market to crash, leading to a bull market with high average price 
 
5 Conditional Price Limiters 
Comparing the dynamics with and without price limiters, one can see that by imposing 
certain price limiters a central authority can effectively limit strong reactions of the 
speculators and stabilize the market price. However, such a policy may lead to 
substantial costs for the central authority. For example, to prevent the price from 
dropping below (going above) the minimum (maximum) price, the central authority 
permanently has to buy (sell) a fraction of the supplied (stored) commodity. Apart from 
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the cost issue (e.g. for maintaining a buffer stock), non-negative storage of the 
commodity prevents unlimited selling at high price limiters. To implement such 
interventions more successfully, we introduce a conditional price limiter mechanism in 
this section.  
The top panel of figure 8 shows the price dynamics when the central authority 
switches between two price limiters: Smin 3.1−=  and Smax 3.1= . If the buffer stock 
exceeds a level of about ±15 a regime shift occurs. As can be seen, the price is thus 
stabilized either in the bull market or in the bear market. The duration of a regime is 
around 80 periods. Between the two regimes we observe a brief transient phase of 
around 20 periods in which the price evolves uncontrolled. Although the price is still 
distorted, conditional price limiters decrease the price volatility. The bottom panel of 
figure 8 presents the corresponding development of the buffer stock which now neither 
runs empty nor becomes infinitely large. Note that by buying low and selling high the 
interventions may be profitable in the long run. 
Figure 8 goes about here 
It is quite interesting to see how the market prices are influenced by such a 
policy. Speculators may discover and respond to fixed price limiters. To prevent 
arbitrage opportunities, central authorities may thus use more flexible price limiters. 
Figure 9 aims to demonstrate that the imposition of price limiters may create dramatic 
price changes such as bubbles and crashes. In the top panel of figure 9, it is assumed 
that the central authority stabilizes the price in the bear market with a price limiter of     
-1.3. However, from time to time interventions are briefly interrupted. For instance, the 
policy-makers may become afraid of the costs associated with their policy. But seeing 
that without interventions the price increases dramatically, the policy-makers may 
change their opinion once more and reactivate their old policy. Then the price is again 
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bounded in the lower region. As a result, price patterns that resemble bubbles and 
crashes may simply emerge due to the activity of policy-makers. 
Figure 9 goes about here 
 In the second panel of figure 9, the central authority applies a price limiter of  
Smin 3.1−= , buffeted with dynamic noise N (0, 0.3). Overall, the dynamics is still 
stabilized. However, now and then prices run away from bear markets. The reason is 
that the price limiter may be set too low to achieve the lock-in effect. In the third panel 
of figure 9, the central authority regulates the market with Smin 3.1−=  and Smax=1.3, 
both buffeted with dynamic noise N (0, 0.3). Again, temporary stabilizations either in 
the bull or in the bear market set in.  
Finally, in the fourth panel of figure 9, the price limiters are modeled as first-
order auto-regressive processes around 3.1±  with AR coefficients of 0.975 and noise    
N (0, 0.1). Note that the price dynamics become increasingly realistic when the limiters 
are varied in a stochastic matter. Although the behaviors of consumers, producers and 
speculators are still deterministic, the price behavior is quite intricate. Visual inspection 
reveals bubbles and crashes, alternating periods of low and high volatility and also 
larger jumps, which may yield fat tail behavior of the distribution of the returns.6 What 
causes the increase in the complexity of the dynamics? The answer is quite simple. 
Figure 7 already reveals that different price limiters result in different dynamic 
outcomes, e.g. a fixed point may be transformed into a limit cycle. In addition, 
perturbations of the price limiters work as shocks to the system and thus transient 
behavior may occur.  
                                                 
6 Indeed, applying the Hill tail index estimator procedure we find that the model is able to produce tail 
indices of around 3.5. Estimation of the Hurst coefficient for absolute returns reveals values of around 
0.75, indicating strong volatility clustering. 
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6 Conclusions 
This paper is concerned with commodity price dynamics. Actual commodity prices 
fluctuate strongly: Not only is the price volatility high, also severe bubbles and crashes 
regularly emerge. Hence, this topic is of great practical importance, particularly for the 
formulation of economic policy. Although producers and consumers are two primary 
participants in commodity markets, there are also other participants, such as speculators, 
who may have a marked effect both on the degree of price variability and on the success 
of any commodity price stabilization scheme. 
 Within our model, interactions between heterogeneous agents create complex 
bull and bear market fluctuations, which resemble the cyclical price dynamics of many 
commodity markets. Our model shows that: (i) the chartists are a source of market 
instability, as commonly believed; (ii) weak reaction of the speculators (either the 
fundamentalists or the chartists) can push the market to be either a bull or a bear market 
(through pitchfork bifurcations); and (iii) strong reaction of the speculators causes 
market prices to fluctuate irregularly between bull and bear markets (through flip 
bifurcations). Furthermore, we investigate how price boundaries, which function 
identically to a recently suggested chaos control method, affect the price dynamics. We 
find that simple price limits (i) reduce the variability of prices quite strongly, (ii) are 
likely to shift the price in an adverse direction, (iii) and may lead to an unsustainable 
buffer stock. The results are caused by a dynamic lock-in effect. By restricting the 
evolution of the price, the dynamics may become stuck in either the bull or the bear 
market. However, jumping between bottoming and topping price limiters allows a 
central authority to manage the evolution of the buffer stock. Prices are then temporarily 
stabilized in the bull market or the bear market. But it should not be overlooked that 
whenever a central authority introduces a price stabilization scheme it changes the price 
 20
discovery process. For instance, price limiters may trigger marked bubbles and crashes 
or volatility clustering. 
 The study of heterogeneous interacting agents has yielded a number of quite 
sophisticated models which have proven to be quite successful in explaining financial 
market dynamics. Our simple commodity market model is inspired by this approach and 
we would finally like to point out some interesting extensions. First of all, one may 
consider some other popular technical trading rules. For example, agents are often 
reported to extrapolate the most recent price trend. Moreover, as argued in Chiarella 
(1992) or Farmer and Joshi (2002), technical analysis may be nonlinear. Secondly, 
agents may involve some adaptive learning processes when choosing a particular 
trading strategy. For example, the behavior of chartists and fundamentalists may not be 
constant over time with respect to their reaction coefficients, and, although agents are 
boundedly rational, they may try to learn those coefficients. Alternatively, agents’ 
expectations may follow some adaptive learning processes. Thirdly, agents may 
incorporate other switching mechanisms. As argued in Brock and Hommes (1998), one 
may assign each forecast rule a fitness function (which may depend on the historical 
performance of the rules) and then let the agent select a rule according to its fitness. 
Higher complexity may also be achieved by switching from a two-speculator type 
analysis to a real multi-agent market model (Lux and Marchesi 2000). Of course, the 
behavior of both the producers and consumers may also be modeled in more detail. For 
instance, the producers may base their production decision on expected future prices 
and thus select between different kinds of forecast rules, as modeled in Brock and 
Hommes (1997). Finally, the working of different price limiter schemes may also be 
tested in a laboratory setting. Promising work on experimental asset pricing markets has 
been done by Smith (1991) or Sonnemans et al. (2003). 
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Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1  
Let x be the steady state of the map ( )1t tx f x+ = . Then it satisfies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
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b m c m d F x
x F
d F x
− − + −− + − . 
Obviously, the fundamental steady-state price x F=  is always a steady state. For b>m, 






. In other words, when the chartists extrapolate strongly (b>m is 
satisfied), the model generates two nonfundamental steady-state prices S  with one 
( ) above and one ( ) below the fundamental steady-state price F. Note that 
±
S−







b m c m d F x x F
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d F x d F x
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. 
At the fundamental steady-state price F, ( ) ( )' 1f F a m b λ= − − ≡
2
. Hence F is local 
asymptotically stable if . In addition, the eigenvalue λ=1 when m=b 
and λ=-1 when (m-b)a=2. At , 
( )0 a m b< − <
S±
( ) ( )( )2' 1 2 b m c mf S a
b c
λ± − += − ≡+ . 
Hence,  is local asymptotically stable (LAS) if S±
( )( )20 1b m c ma
b c
− +< <+ . 
Furthermore, b=m leads to λ=1, and ( )( )2 1b m c ma
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagrams for parameters b and c. The parameters are increased in 
500 steps as indicated on the axis. The prices are plotted from t=500-600. The other 






































Figure 3: Commodity prices for fixed parameters 1=a , 1.5c = , , ,1=d 1=m 0=F  
and different values of parameter b. 
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Figure 4: Commodity prices phase plots for b=4.0 and 4.5 and fixed parameters 1=a , 
c=1.5, , m  and . 1=d 1= 0=F
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Figure 5: The top panel shows the unrestricted evolution of the commodity price in the 
time domain. The bottom panel shows the same, but with a lower price boundary of               
























Figure 6: The left (right) panel presents the unrestricted (restricted) evolution of the 
commodity price in phase space. The smooth lines indicate the one-dimensional map. 










































Figure 7: The bifurcation diagrams in the first line of panels show how the price reacts 
to more restrictive price boundaries. The price limits are varied in 500 steps and the 
prices are plotted from t=500-600. The parameter setting is as in figure 1. The second 
and third lines of panels show the mean and the variance of the price process (buffeted 
with dynamic noise N (0, 0.1). All statistics are based on 10,000 observations. 
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Figure 8: The top panel shows the price dynamics when the central authority switches 
between the price limiters Smin 3.1−=  and Smax 3.1= . A change in regime occurs if the 
buffer stock exceeds a level of about ±15. The bottom panel shows the corresponding 
evolution of the buffer stock. The other parameters are 1=a , 5.4=b , , 5.1=c 1=d , 



































Figure 9: Price dynamics under different regimes. First panel: Price limiter Smin 25.1−= ; 
interupted every 100 periods. Second panel: Price limiter Smin 3.1−= , buffeted with 
dynamic noise N (0, 0.3). Third panel: Price limiters Smin 3.1−=  and Smax=1.3, both 
buffeted with dynamic noise N (0, 0.3). Fourth panel: Price limiters as first-order auto-
regressive processes around  with AR coefficients of 0.975 and noise N (0, 0.1). 
The other parameters are , 
3.1±
1=a 5.4=b , 5.1=c , 1=d , 1=m  and . 0=F
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